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ABSTRACT
LANDRE, KRISTEN K. Acquirer Shareholder Value Creation in United States Mergers
& Acquisitions. Department of Economics, June 2017.
ADVISOR: Professor Kaywana Raeburn, Department of Economics, Union College
Mergers and acquisitions remain the primary corporate growth strategy for
executives around the world. While deals continue to rise in popularity, their
success in generating value for participating firms remain uncertain. A vast majority
of merger and acquisition research focuses on this disparity and considers whether
they create or destroy value for stakeholders. In this thesis, I examine the value
generated to shareholders by US acquisitions and mergers announced between
2005 and 2009. Utilizing the event study methodology, I evaluate cumulative
abnormal returns (CAR) for acquiring firms to analyze the wealth effects of merger
and acquisition announcements. CAR is a direct measure of the change in
shareholder wealth resulting from an event because CAR represent the difference
between the return conditional on the event and the expected return. I find that
acquiring firm shareholders realized average cumulative abnormal returns of 1.572% during a five-day event window centered around the event announcement,
and -3.905% during a two-month event window. Furthermore, when distinguishing
the characteristics of deals that impact the returns to shareholders, transaction
value has a statistically significant negative correlation with CAR. The results of this
thesis support previous literature findings that the returns to shareholders of the
acquiring firms are often not significant and sometimes negative.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
A. Background Information
Executives seeking growth for their firms consider a multitude of strategies, yet
mergers and acquisitions remain the primary approach to reach this goal. Although
deals can be appealing to help reduce costs, increase sales, and gain access to new
technologies or geographic region, research continues to suggest the failure rate is
between 70 and 90% for mergers and acquisitions (Christensen et al. 2011).
Regardless of the high risk associated with deals, mergers and acquisitions
continue to grow in value and frequency. 2015 is regarded as the biggest year ever
for mergers and acquisitions, reaching a record high deal value of $4.7 trillion
(KPMG LLP, 2016). According to KPMG’s survey of 550 mergers and acquisitions
professionals, deals are expected to accelerate and continue to increase in value and
size. Furthermore, the survey found that 91% of executives plan to execute one or
more acquisition in the next 12 months, compared to 82% in 2015 (KPMG LLP,
2016). A primary reason executives are selecting mergers and acquisitions as the
predominant growth strategy for their firms is the current economic environment
“where S&P 500 Earnings Per Share projections have continued to decline,
demonstrating weakening confidence in organic growth” (KPMG LLP, 2016, p.16).
Respondents to KPMG’s survey also cited enhancing technologies, extending their
geographic reach, entering new lines of business, and expanding their customer
base as motivations for acquisitions.
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As a result of the high-risk nature of mergers and acquisitions, there are multiple
factors that are critical to a deal’s success. Key elements of a successful merger or
acquisition include a prompt and well-executed integration strategy, accurate
transaction value, thorough due diligence, and positive external conditions
(Christensen et al. 2011 and KPMG LLP 2016). Strategic fit serves as the most
important criterion for a successful deal, focusing primarily on ensuring the
acquirer and target company have compatible business models. In addition, cultural
fit is important for long-term success and integration of the consolidated companies.
Although the specific motivations for deals vary, the ultimate goal is to boost
performance and increase firm value. It is important to consider the various parties
that can be affected by a deal because not all parties may benefit equally, and in fact,
different groups of stakeholders may simultaneously be inversely impacted from a
merger or acquisition. The first, and probably most obvious group affected, is the
employees of both companies. While some employees may be promoted or see no
change in employment status, deals can also lead to companies laying off large sums
of people due to a new technology or method to reduce costs, therefore decreasing
value to employees. Another group subject to a deal’s effects is the consumers of the
product or services offered by the company. It may be assumed that customers
would experience an increase in value from a deal, if new technologies were
introduced to expand or improve product offerings, but it must also be considered
that a merger or acquisition may drive up prices for consumers, leading to an
adverse effect. The final party that experiences changes in firm value from a deal is
the company’s shareholders. Shareholders of companies participating in deals could
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be impacted by changes in share prices from a deal. Depending on the success of the
merger or acquisition, and the overall perception of the deal from shareholders, it
could result in value creation or destruction. Theoretically, a rise in share prices
would lead to value creation and a decrease in share prices would result in value
destruction for the shareholders. To evaluate the influence of a deal on company
shareholders, the stock price is used. Stock price is an optimal tool to analyze the
value of a firm because it is theorized that a stock price represents the “expected
present value of future net cash flows” (Thorbecke, 1997, p.635). As mentioned
above, for the shareholders, it is desirable for the company to see a rise in its stock
price because it contributes to total shareholder return, which is a measure of the
company’s performance (Deelder, Goedhart and Agrawal, 2008). Share price
appreciation indicates that there is value creation for the firm and investors feel
positively about the company’s performance in the future. This thesis will
specifically focus on the impact of mergers and acquisitions on company
shareholders as a result of the deal announcement.
B. Research Question
Although mergers and acquisitions remain the primary source of strategic
growth, there is consistent concern about whether deals result in value creation or
value destruction for the participating firms (Farinós, Herrero and Latorre 2014). It
is important to continue to evaluate the impact of deals to determine whether
mergers and acquisitions are worth the risk that is undertaken. This thesis will
focus primarily on the immediate value created for shareholders. One method of
assessing the potential value creation or destruction for shareholders that results
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from a deal is examining the participating companies’ stock prices. Stock prices
reflect the company’s current value, but can also represent growth over a given time
period (Investopedia.com 2014). To determine the effect of a merger or acquisition
on a company’s stock price, abnormal returns will be evaluated because they
represent the returns generated over a period of time that differ from the expected
return.
In order to further understand the impact of mergers and acquisitions on the
participating companies and their shareholders, this thesis addresses the following
question: Do acquisitions create or destroy value for the shareholders of the
acquiring firms?
To answer this question, a sample of 50 acquisitions was taken from Thomson
One’s event database. The sample was based on multiple criteria and covered the
time period of 2005-2015. To determine the effect of the acquisition on the
acquiring firm’s shareholders, an event study was employed to establish whether
the acquiring company experienced significantly different returns from what was
expected for the specified time period around the merger announcement date. To
calculate returns, the company stock prices over a given time period were collected
for a sample of acquisitions that occurred in the United States between 2005 and
2009. Furthermore, from these stock prices and market data, expected returns and
actual returns were calculated. Abnormal returns are constructed by finding the
difference between the observed return and the predicted return. The abnormal
return is the variance in the return conditional on the acquisition (Kothari and
Warner, 2007).
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Furthermore, if a large amount of variance exists within the returns across the
time period cumulative abnormal returns can be calculated by summing the average
returns over multiple periods (Brooks, 2013). In addition to abnormal returns, a test
statistic can be calculated off the cumulative abnormal returns to determine if the
change in company stock returns for the given event period is significant.
C. Motivation and Significance of Thesis
Mergers and acquisitions continue to serve as a primary avenue for companies
seeking to achieve synergies and to generate added value to the organization.
Synergies are defined as the effects “arising between two or more agents, entities,
factors, or substances that produce an effect greater than the sum of their individual
effects” and added value is “used in several ways to indicate an enhancement to a
product or an entity” (Eliasson, 2011, p.1). A common representation of this in
mergers and acquisitions is 1+1=3. It demonstrates that synergies and value added
suggest that the combination of two firms should create a combined effect greater
than the individual entities.
Although deals remain the prominent means to attain greater value for firms and
their stakeholders, failure is more likely than success. In the context of mergers and
acquisitions, success would be indicated by value creation to company stakeholders.
It is important to actively evaluate the effects mergers and acquisitions on
participating companies to establish whether deals should continue to be a common
corporate growth strategy.
A significant portion of current mergers and acquisition literature focuses on the
wealth effects generated by deals, but primarily examines the effects realized by the
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acquired company. While it is assumed that an acquiring company will experience
positive financial effects as a result of an acquisition, it is important to determine if
this, in fact, is true.
The significance of this thesis is to assess the wealth effects of acquisitions on
acquiring companies, and whether those effects led to value creation or destruction.
Ultimately, this can lead to a conclusion as to whether these deal were a productive
source of corporate growth, and contribute to the body of research mergers and
acquisitions and their wealth effects.
D. Structure of Thesis
This thesis is organized into six chapters. Chapter I is the introduction, which
outlines the research, provides background information on the topic and identifies
the research question. Chapter II examines previous research conducted on mergers
and acquisitions. Relevant literature includes a background on mergers and
acquisitions, a discussion of the motivations for deals, and whether deals create or
destroy value for participating firms. Chapter III presents the analytical framework
employed for the thesis. This chapter considers event study methodology and how
abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns are utilized to evaluate the
effect of acquisitions on the shareholders of a company. Chapter IV provides an indepth discussion of the data. This section discusses the source of the data and
summarizes the sample of acquisitions. Chapter V analyzes the data on multiple
dimensions, and presents the findings. Finally Chapter VI assesses the findings, and
draws conclusions based on the research. Furthermore, this section will evaluate
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the limitations to the analysis, possible implications of the findings, and potential
avenues for further research.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
There has been extensive research on the implications of mergers and
acquisitions and its wealth effects. Chapter II focuses on two different aspects of
mergers and acquisition literature. First, it provides background information on
mergers and acquisitions, specifically the varying motivations for initiating deals,
different potential payment structures, and characteristics of successful deals. A
discussion of the various parties affected by a deal is also included. Next, this section
reviews previous research conducted on the financial impacts of deals on
participating companies through the evaluation of stock prices and returns.
A. Introduction
As a function of their rising popularity and high risk, mergers and acquisitions
attract the interest and attention of researchers and executives from a variety of
backgrounds. According to Cartwright and Schoenberg (2006), attention from a
broad range of disciplines enables merger and acquisition research to incorporate
the “financial, strategic, behavioral, operational and cross-cultural aspects of this
challenging and high risk activity” (p. 2). The authors note research on the cultural
and psychological features has grown in recent years, but the majority of merger
and acquisition research remains concentrated on financial and market studies,
focused on the US and UK markets. Based on a comprehensive review of relevant
literature, the following discussion highlights important background information
and terms related to mergers and acquisitions and findings from prior research on
the wealth effects from deals.
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B. Background Information on Mergers and Acquisitions
Mergers and acquisitions are complex growth strategies that involve multiple
parties. Sherman’s (2010) book entitled, Mergers & Acquisitions: From A to Z, as well
as Clayman, Fridson and Troughton’s (2015) book written for the CFA Institute on
mergers and acquisitions provide a comprehensive background on deals. According
to Sherman (2010), a merger involves two or more companies joining as peers. In a
merger, the buying firm typically retains its original identity and absorbs the assets
and liabilities of the selling firm. There are multiple classifications of mergers that
are related to the business activities of the two parties merging. A horizontal merger
occurs when the companies are in the same line of business, and are often
competing with one another. A vertical merger transpires when two companies are
in the same line of production. Finally, a conglomerate merger results when two
companies in unrelated lines of business join together (Clayman, Fridson and
Troughton, 2015). An acquisition can be defined as one company acting as the
buyer, or the acquirer, and another company acting as the seller, or the target
company (Clayman, Fridson and Troughton, 2015).
There are multiple forms of payment that companies can use to pay for the
transaction. They include cash, securities purchase and asset purchase. In a
securities, or stock, purchase transaction, the “seller’s shares are not necessarily
combined with the buyer’s existing company, but are often kept separate as a new
subsidiary or operating division” (Sherman, 2010, p. 3). In an asset purchase
transaction, the assets sold to the buyer become additional assets of the company.
The hope of the acquiring company is that the value of the assets purchased from
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the target company will surpass the price paid, and ultimately enhance shareholder
value over time (Sherman, 2010).
There has been a significant amount of prior research on executives’ motivation
for mergers and acquisitions. In KPMG’s survey of 550 mergers and acquisitions
professionals, it was concluded that the “top factor by far was an organizational
desire to fortify their competitive position” (KPMG LLP, 2016, p. 6). To become more
competitive and create value for stakeholders, it is often assumed that synergies are
the optimal means to that end. As discussed earlier, synergies are defined as “the
source of the tangible expected improvement in earnings that occurs when two
businesses merge” (Walker, Hansell, Kengelbach, Bathia and Dawson, 2016).
While synergies are often a broad objective of executives, the desire to
participate in a deal can also be examined more specifically by considering the
reasons for mergers and acquisitions separately. Sherman (2010) discusses the
specific motivations for each. For a merger, the author identifies multiple objectives
including the desire to add a new product line, enter a new market, or increase
distribution reach geographically or demographically (Sherman, 2010). Sherman
adds the following as potential motivations for mergers: obtain tax benefits,
redistribute excess capital for more cost-effective uses, increase the scale of
production for current products, advance technology, “restructure industry value
chain, and respond to competitive cost pressures through economies of scale and
scope” (Sherman, 2010, p. 11-12). Furthermore, although firms often initiate a
merger as a growth strategy, deals can also be motivated by the necessity to stay
afloat and survive bad times. A merger or acquisition can help a company avoid
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bankruptcy or shutting down. In his analysis of the reasons why mergers are
initiated, Sherman (2010) also adds that deals may be driven by a key trend in a
specific industry. For example, in the banking and telecommunications industries,
robust competition is driving deals, whereas shifting consumer preferences are
motivating deals in the food and beverage industry. In the health-care industry,
Sherman (2010) cites the pressure to control costs as the main factor driving deals,
whereas a general reduction in demand, specifically a declining federal defense
budget, is motivating deals in the defense contract and aerospace industries (p. 7).
In addition to mergers, Sherman (2010) evaluates the reasons for initiating
acquisitions. As a result of the nature of acquisitions, the motivations need to be
considered separately for the buying and selling company. For the seller, Sherman
(2010) states that a company desiring great access to the resources of the buyer, an
inability to compete as an independent entity or the desire or necessity to reduce
costs can all act as motivations to initiate an acquisition. According to Sherman
(2010), there are multiple factors that drive an acquisition for the buyer which
include: “revenue enhancement, cost reduction, vertical and/or horizontal
operational synergies or economies of scale, growth pressures from investors,
underutilized resources, desire to reduce competition, need to gain market share in
new geographic region, diversify new products and services” (p. 10-11).
Furthermore, Christensen et al. (2011) suggest that a company may elect to partake
in an acquisition to reinvent its business model and fundamentally redirect itself, as
well as to improve the company’s performance (p. 2). The varying motivations for
mergers and acquisitions enable deals to meet a variety of objectives, and ultimately
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contribute to why mergers and acquisitions are the primary strategy of corporate
development regardless of the risk the company may be undertaking.
C. Drivers of Value Creation in Mergers and Acquisitions
Mergers and acquisitions remain at the forefront of inorganic growth strategies
for executives seeking to improve performance and create value for their
companies. The support for deals by executives demonstrates the monetary,
strategic, and social importance they have in corporate finance. Although many
believe deals are the optimal approach to generating inorganic growth, mergers and
acquisition performance remains disappointing. In an effort to understand why
mergers and acquisitions frequently underperform, it is critical to evaluate the
factors that drive a successful deal. There is a vast amount of literature that
attempts to understand the low success rates of mergers and acquisitions, and the
commonalities amongst value-returning deals.
Through a survey of previous research, it is evident there are countless factors
deemed relevant to a successful deal, but certain characteristics are more critical
and most commonly connected with merger and acquisition performance. Gomes,
Angwin, Weber and Tarba (2013) surveyed an abundance of merger and acquisition
literature to understand which factors are most critical to success in the preacquisition and post-acquisition periods. Gomes et al. (2013) asserts it is critical to
make the distinction because the process of mergers and acquisitions must be taken
into consideration. The first factor Gomes et al. consider is the actual selection of a
strategic partner for the merger or acquisition. The strengths and weaknesses of
each company should be evaluated to ensure “strategic and organizational fit”
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(Gomes et al., 2013, p.19). In order to assess the fit of the company, Gomes et al.
recommends the following dimensions be examined: “strengths and weaknesses,
future investment requirements, quality of the target company’s management team,
and implementation barriers including cultural differences and human resources
implications such as top management turnover” (Gomes et al., 2013, p.19).
Furthermore, the actual size of the participating companies should be weighed as
this can have implications on the overall fit.
Another factor the authors deliberated in their review of literature to be of
importance for a deal’s performance is the transaction price. From a financial
perspective, the authors concluded that if the buying firm pays a price that is
considered too high, it would greatly increase the failure rate. Gomes et al. (2013)
cite research by Goold, Campbell and Alexander (1994, p.220), who found “one of
the most common and most important sources of value destruction in corporate
development is paying too much. Often the acquirer destroys value by paying too
much, making it very difficult to achieve an adequate return.” In addition to the
possibility of being unable to attain a positive return due to paying an excessive
price, stakeholders of the buying company may perceive the deal as a poor growth
strategy, and thus will respond negatively.
Post-acquisition critical success factors are also of importance to ensure value
creation. Gomes et al. (2013) emphasize the integration period is of primary
significance for a successful merger or acquisition. The authors highlight multiple
elements of integration including the overall strategy and pace. First, as a function of
the multi-dimensional nature of mergers and acquisitions, integration strategies
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should reflect the specific features of the deal. By tailoring the integration approach
to the deal, executives can exploit the strengths and areas of growth for both firms.
In addition to the overall strategy of the integration period, the speed of
implementation is associated with the merger and acquisition performance. Gomes
at al. (2013) found that although it can be discomforting for executives, it is optimal
for the integration of both companies to be as quick as possible. The authors state,
“Proceeding slowly may cause uncertainty to build and rumor to thrive. Morale can
suffer, and customers get forgotten” (Gomes et al., 2013, p.24). They reinforce the
importance of a swift integration period by asserting, “The costs of losing the
momentum of a business are much greater than the costs associated with mistakes
through quick decisions” (Gomes et al., 2013, p.24). This demonstrates the potential
loss of value to shareholders that could result slow implementation.
In their study of European mergers and acquisitions and their shareholder value
creation, Campa and Hernando (2004) consider key value drivers for deals. The
authors suggest the presence of synergies, whether through cost reduction, removal
of duplicate activities, or development of economies of scale, is of critical
importance. Mergers and acquisitions with higher levels of synergies have proven to
return higher value compared to unrelated mergers because there is a higher
“degree of relatedness between the buyer and seller [which] is positively associated
with returns” (Campa and Hernando, 2004, p. 58). Another value driver for deals
discussed by the authors is value investment. While not as thoroughly researched as
other characteristics of successful mergers and acquisitions, this theory proposes
that value investment will likely create value for the participating firms. Campa and
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Hernando (2004) define value investment as, “when buyers purchase apparently
cheap firms (low book-to-market ratios)” (p.61). The authors found that acquiring
companies following this approach obtained positive cumulative abnormal returns,
while buyers purchasing companies with high book-to-market value ratios
experienced a negative stock market reaction.
As demonstrated by the review of the literature on factors driving performance
of mergers and acquisition, it is evident that deals are multi-dimensional and
require careful planning and integration to ensure value generation to shareholders.
D. Prior Research on Mergers and Acquisitions Wealth Effects
The complex phenomenon of mergers and acquisitions has attracted an
abundance of executives and researchers from a wide array of disciplines. A large
emphasis of current research focuses on the features that define a successful deal
versus one that fails because, contrary to their popularity, mergers and acquisitions
continue to deliver a mixed performance for the expansive range of stakeholders
involved. While it is imperative to consider the defining factors that drive a
successful deal, research also must be performed to evaluate the value that deals are
creating, or not, for companies. The research on this topic is most relevant for this
thesis, as its primary focus is to determine if acquiring firms are realizing positive
returns following an acquisition. The remainder of this literature review examines
wealth creation or destruction following a merger or acquisition.
Cartwright and Schoenberg (2006) consider this phenomenon and discuss the
mixed performance of deals, with a primary focus on acquisitions. The authors
highlight discrepancies between returns experienced by target and acquiring firms.
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Cartwright and Schoenberg (2006) cite research by Agrawal and Jaffe (2000) who
found that target companies typically achieve positive short-term returns, whereas
acquiring companies are more likely to face negative returns in the short-term. In
addition to considering the short-term effects on stock prices, Cartwright and
Schoenberg (2006) assessed stock prices over a longer time period, as this is more
indicative of the firm’s long-term value. For target firms, the research by Agrawal
and Jaffe (2000) reveals that “the abnormal returns accruing to acquiring firms in
the years following an acquisition are negative or, at best, not statistically different
from zero” (Cartwright and Schoenberg, 2006, p.6). The performance of acquisitions
for the buying companies is also mediocre, with 35-45% of acquirers experiencing
positive returns in the two to three years post-deal (Cartwright and Schoenberg,
2006). In addition to evaluating post-acquisition wealth effects in the form of stock
prices, Cartwright and Schoenberg (2006) also discuss whether the original
objectives of a deal were met as a measure of success. The authors found that
internal managers of acquiring firms conclude that only 56% of acquisitions can be
deemed successful against the initial objectives set out for the deal. These results
emphasize the mixed performance of deals and the necessity to continue to evaluate
mergers and acquisitions in more depth to determine if they are worth the potential
risk.
In a study conducted by Chan, Ge and Lin (2015), the authors collected data on
7,047 deals that occurred between January 1996 and December 2010 to analyze the
effect of mergers and acquisitions announcements on cumulative abnormal returns.
In their research, the authors found that a majority of target firms experience
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positive cumulative abnormal returns following a deal announcement. Furthermore,
the authors estimated the mean return for target firms to be 16.62%, which they
found to be significantly higher than the cumulative abnormal returns for acquirers
(Chan, Ge and Lin, 2015, p. 1077). From these results, it appears shareholders of
target firms view acquisitions optimistically and expect positive returns. In the
study, the authors also found that acquisition announcements for the acquirers have
varied perceptions by investors. Circumstances that typically lead to beneficial
results include whether the acquisition involves firms within the same industry and
whether the transaction is funded by cash or debt (Chan, Ge and Lin, 2015, p. 1060).
Chan, Ge and Lin’s research highlights the discrepancies in the returns of the buying
firm and acquired firm, and the role that investors’ perceptions may play in the
variation.
Furthermore, McKinsey & Company conducted a study on 231 deals in the global
telecommunications, European banking, and global petroleum sectors to address
the assertion that “at least half of all the big mergers, acquisitions, and alliances that
make headlines fail to create significant shareholder value” (Bieshaar, Knight and
van Wassenaer, 2001). The study found that deals with an “expansionist” approach,
with objectives like opening new distribution outlets or expanding the combined
companies’ reach result in the greatest increase in stock value. In contrast,
“transformative” deals, which are intended to diversify, are more likely to destroy
value (Bieshaar, Knight and van Wassenaer, 2001). This demonstrates that mergers
and acquisitions with the goal of fundamentally changing the company have less
favorable market reactions than deals that aim to develop or grow current assets of
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both companies. Another finding of the study was that when all else was held equal,
the markets performed best for acquisitions compared to mergers. McKinsey’s
research provided a wide array of findings in regards to the actual nature of the deal
and its probable performance.
Moffett and Naserbakht (2013) evaluated the financial effects of mergers and
acquisitions in the United States banking industry through analysis of stock price
behavior of firms involved in 154 deals that occurred between 2000 and 2010. The
authors utilized event study methodology to investigate the financial impacts of
mergers and acquisitions on the target and acquiring banks. The authors
constructed an estimation window of -60 to +60 days, and ensured no other special
events occurred during this time period, enabling them to measure the stock market
reaction through actual returns. The authors cite Neely and de Cossio (1987) and
Trifts and Scanlon (1987) who concluded that during the week a merger proposal is
announced, target banks often achieve a substantial rise in stock price, while the
bidding banks experience a smaller drop in the stock price (Moffett and Naserbakht,
2013). Conversely, in their study Moffett and Naserbakht (2013) found average
actual returns for both target and acquiring banks increased in the short-term as a
result of merger and acquisition announcements contradicting the majority of
previous research on the effect of deals on stock prices. One possible explanation for
this dissimilarity is that Moffett and Naserbakht analyzed the actual returns of the
stock price instead of the abnormal return like most other research on mergers and
acquisitions.
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Trifts and Scanlon (2014) evaluated the effects of interstate bank mergers on the
acquiring and target firms’ shareholders. Through their study of 17 acquired and 14
acquiring banks participating in 21 deals, the authors found that “shareholders of
acquired banks earn large, statistically significant abnormal returns while
shareholders of acquiring banks earn insignificant abnormal returns around the
announcement of the merger” (Trifts and Scanlon, 2014, p. 311). In addition to
examining the effects on the firms’ shareholders, Trifts and Scanlon (2014) also
analyzed the cumulative abnormal returns bases on the size of the bank. The
authors concluded from their study that smaller banks involved in interstate
mergers experienced considerably larger returns compared to larger banks. Trifts
and Scanlon (2014) discuss multiple explanations for this discrepancy including the
platform in which they are traded, predominately whether the companies are
traded on the New York Stock Exchange or over the counter. The authors also
suggest there may be market segmentation for bank acquisitions, which could lead
to larger banks competing at a higher level than smaller banks. This could
potentially lead to investors believing that large banks involved in mergers and
acquisitions will not be affected by a deal as much because “they are not materially
altering the geographic scope of their operations,” whereas interstate bank mergers
“appear to represent valuable new opportunities for geographic market expansion”
(Trifts and Scanlon, 2014, p.311). Trifts and Scanlon’s (2014) research suggests that
the market’s reaction will vary for the target and acquiring company, as well as
based on the size of the company.
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Campa and Hernando (2004) examine the value generated to shareholders from
262 mergers and acquisitions announcements involving European Union companies
between 1998 and 2000. The authors utilized event study methodology and
constructed seven different windows to evaluate cumulative abnormal returns:
three pre-announcement windows, one short-term window around the
announcement day, a window including the announcement day and thirty days
prior, and two windows including post-announcement returns. Similar to other
merger and acquisition literature, Campa and Hernando (2004) found target firms
experienced a price run-up one month prior to the announcement and an
announcement effect with cumulative abnormal returns of 5% and 4% respectively.
Furthermore, the authors concluded the cumulative abnormal returns post
announcement were not significant for the targets. For the acquiring companies,
Campa and Hernando (2004) found no significant cumulative abnormal returns preor post-announcement, but did see vague indication of a price run-up effect. When
the authors analyzed the cumulative abnormal returns of their entire sample, they
found 60% of target firms experienced positive cumulative abnormal returns, while
approximately 55% of acquiring firms experienced negative cumulative abnormal
returns. Of the cumulative abnormal returns displayed by the acquiring companies,
none appeared to be statistically significant. Campa and Hernando (2004) findings
reinforce the likely pattern of value creation for shareholders of target companies,
but more ambiguous wealth effects for shareholders of acquiring companies
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E. Conclusion
Research on mergers and acquisitions has grown in prevalence and scope,
encompassing more elements of deals as a function of the rise in both frequency and
value of deals across the globe. While the findings are mixed, a majority of the
research discussed above concludes that target firms typically experience some
amount of positive returns following a deal, but such returns are more elusive for
acquiring firms. The aim of this thesis is to further examine the uncertainty of
returns for acquiring companies and determine if acquisitions are a worthwhile
strategy for corporate growth.
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CHAPTER III
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
Chapter III discusses the analytical framework utilized to examine the wealth
effects of mergers and acquisitions on company shareholders. In Section I, the event
study methodology is explained, and the event study windows are defined for this
thesis. Section II defines abnormal returns as a primary measure to establish
whether an event led to a systematic difference in a company’s returns. Section III
discusses cumulative abnormal returns, a second measure to estimate the return as
a result of an acquisition. Section IV states the hypothesis for this study.
A. Event Study
As this thesis aims to evaluate the effect of mergers and acquisitions on a
company’s wealth, while specifically focusing on the returns to shareholders for the
acquiring company, it is necessary to use an analytical framework that can measure
the impact of the deal on the company. In order to do so, an event study was
employed. Economists use event studies to assess the effect of an economic event on
a company’s value using financial market data because they analyze return behavior
for a sample of companies experiencing a similar type of event (Kothari and Warner,
2007). Event studies are most commonly utilized to measure the impact of earnings
announcements, stock splits, dividend announcements, and merger and acquisition
announcements (Moffett and Naserbakht, 2013). This methodology is widely used
because event studies operate on the assumption that markets are efficient, and
therefore the asset prices of a company will reflect an economic event immediately
(Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay, 1997). Therefore, an event’s economic impact on a
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firm can be measured using a company’s stock prices over a given time period,
called the event window. For this thesis, two separate event windows were utilized.
The first event window was defined to assess the immediate effect of the merger
announcement and included stock prices from two days prior to the deal to two
days post deal. The second event window analyzes the short-term effect of the
merger announcement and includes stock price from 30 days prior to 30 days post.
In addition to the event window, the estimation window, which is utilized to predict
the expected return, was calculated for each company. The estimation window for
the immediate event window (-2 to +2) included stock prices from 90 days prior to
30 days before the deal announcement. For the second event window (-30 to +30),
the estimation window included stocks prices from 120 days prior to 60 days prior.
Figure 1 displays the formal definition of the estimation, event, and post-event
windows.
Figure 1: Formal Definition of Event Study Windows

Source: Exhibit constructed by author, inspired by Campbell, Lo & McKinley (1997)

Immediate Window
Where:
T! = −90 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠
T! = −30 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠
T! = −2 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠
T! = +2 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠
T! = +2 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠

Short-Term Window
Where:
T! = −120 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠
T! = −60 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠
T! = −30 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠
T! = +30 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠
T! = +2 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠
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B. Abnormal Returns
Utilizing the event study methodology, abnormal returns are used to measure
the impact of an acquisition on the acquiring company. According to Nasdaq,
abnormal returns can be defined as “the component of the return that is not due
to systematic influences (market-wide influences). In other words, the abnormal
return is the difference between the actual return that is expected to result from
market movements (normal return)” (“Abnormal Returns” 2016). Abnormal returns
are used because, in addition to the deal, there are multiple factors that could
influence a company’s stock price that would not be captured by actual returns.
Through the examination of stock price behavior of US banks that participated in
acquisitions, Moffett and Naserbakht (2013) found “the observed changes in the
stock price of a bank during the event window cannot be attributed exclusively to
that announcement since stock prices are affected by a multitude of factors other
than the announcement of the merger proposal” (p. 109). Furthermore, Kothari and
Warner (2007) assert that as the abnormal return represents “the difference
between the return conditional on the event and the expected return unconditional
on the event,” it is a “direct measure of the (unexpected) change in security holder
wealth associated with the event” (p.9). The following equation displays the
calculation for abnormal returns where ARit, Rit and E(Rit) are abnormal returns,
actual returns and expected returns, respectively:
𝐴𝑅!" = 𝑅!" − 𝐸(𝑅!" )
To calculate expected returns, the constant-mean-return model or market model
can be used. The constant-mean-return model assumes that an “asset’s return over
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time is independent and identically normally distributed with a constant (time
invariant) mean and variance” (Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay, 1997, p. 151). In
contrast, the market model assumes that the return on an asset is dependent “on the
return on the market portfolio and the extent of the security’s responsiveness as
measured by beta. The return also depends on conditions that are unique to the
firm” (“Market Model” 2016). This thesis will use the market model to determine
expected returns because it is the most widely used approach to construct expected
returns as it is a more realistic representation of a company’s stock price (Brooks,
2013).
C. Cumulative Abnormal Returns
To evaluate the effect of the merger over the entire event window, daily
abnormal returns are aggregated to calculate cumulative abnormal returns. By
accumulating the abnormal performance from the entire event window, the overall
impact on the firm is more easily defined, and can be tested for significance. The
following equation shows the calculation for cumulative abnormal returns (CAR)
starting at time t1 through time t2 as the summation of abnormal returns.
!!

𝐶𝐴𝑅 𝑡!, 𝑡! =

𝐴𝑅!
!!!!

From cumulative abnormal returns, a test statistic can be constructed to determine
if the difference in a company’s returns following an acquisition announcement is
statistically different from the predicted return.
D. Hypothesis
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When utilizing an event study framework, the goal is to observe the level of
abnormal returns resulting from a firm event. For this thesis, the null hypothesis is
that abnormal returns will be equal to zero, and therefore the acquisition had no
effect on the company’s stock price. Furthermore, the alternative hypothesis is that
abnormal returns will not be equal to zero, thus there was an effect on the firm’s
stock price as a due to an acquisition.

26

CHAPTER IV
DATA
Chapter IV discusses the data utilized for this thesis. Section A explains the
criteria developed to select the sample, and section B examines the sample more
specifically by evaluating the companies in the sample by transaction size and
industry.
A. Introduction to Data
To evaluate the effect of an acquisition on shareholder wealth, a sample of
acquisitions will be examined. The sample was selected from Thomson Reuter’s
event database using the following criteria: deals completed in the past ten years,
USD currency and deals that are defined as “merger” or “acquisition.” This produced
a population of 31,097 mergers and acquisitions that occurred from 2005 to 2015.
To reduce the population further and control for multiple external factors, an
additional series of criteria was developed. First, the target and acquirer companies
had to be headquartered, or predominately located, in the United States only. This
was in an effort to reduce the effect of any country-specific regulations and laws for
mergers and acquisitions, as well as limit the impact of varying market and
economic conditions of multiple countries. Furthermore, the United States was
specifically selected because “the U.S. continues to be the favored M&A (mergers
and acquisitions) destination because of its relatively healthy economy” (KPMG LLP,
2016, p.9). Next, the data was filtered to include deals that had been fully completed.
While it could be valuable to examine deals that are still in the process of
implementation and integration or deals that ultimately failed to materialize, for
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consistency, in this study, all acquisition transactions had to be completed. A final
criterion for inclusion in the sample is the value of the transaction had to exceed
$1.5 billion. This is to ensure that all acquisitions were of substantial size, and a
significant event in a company’s news.
A stratified random sample of 50 deals from 2005 to 2009 was selected. Within
the sample, ten acquisitions were selected from 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009 to
provide an equal distribution of acquisitions across the five years. The following
information was taken from the Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum Database for each
acquisition: year, date announced, date effective, target name, acquiring name, and
value of transaction.
In addition to the acquisition information, stock prices for each day within a
selected time period were collected to evaluate whether the deal resulted in wealth
creation for the shareholders. For each acquisition, the acquiring firm’s stock price
was found using Yahoo Finance. Stock prices for every trading day one-year prior to
one-year post of the date announced were collected. If the market was not open on
the day the acquisition was announced, data from the next trading day thereafter
was used. The company’s dividends, if applicable, were automatically accounted for
in the adjusted closing price, which was used to calculate the returns.
To assess the effect of a deal on the company’s stock prices through an analysis
of abnormal returns, the expected return of each company must be found. Expected
return is expressed as a function of the company’s stock potential return outcomes
and associated probabilities (Teall, 1958). To accomplish this, market data was
collected for the same 24-month time period for each individual acquisition.
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B. Discussion of Sample
As previously mentioned, the sample for this thesis was randomly selected and
included 50 acquisitions that had their official deal announcements between 2005
and 2009. The acquisitions covered a range of industries including consumer retail,
energy service, financial services, health care/life sciences, industrial goods, real
estate/gaming/leisure, and technology/media/telecommunications. To categorize
the companies by industry, Wall Street Journal’s summary information for each
company was utilized. Table 1 displays the distribution of acquisitions across the
various industries.
Table 1: Distribution of Sample Across Industries

Roughly 30% of the companies in the sample belong to the technology, media
and telecommunications industry. The financial services and consumer retail
industries each had approximately 20% of the sample, whereas companies in the
energy service and healthcare/life sciences industries comprised 10% each.
Industrial goods and real estate/gaming/leisure had the smallest representation in
the sample. Of the 50 companies in the sample, 47 are S&P500 companies.
Prominent acquiring companies include Proctor and Gamble, Hewlett Packard,
Verizon, AT&T, Boeing, Wells Fargo & Co, Bank of America, Berkshire Hathaway,
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Cisco Systems, Dow Chemical Company, Walt Disney, Johnson and Johnson,
Microsoft, Oracle, Pfizer, Comcast, and MetLife.
The ten largest acquisitions had transaction values of greater than $18 billion.
The acquiring companies in these deals included Pfizer Inc., Proctor & Gamble,
Exxon Mobile Corporation, Bank of America, Verizon Wireless, Boston Scientific
Corporation, CVS Pharmacy, Comcast Corporation, and Chevron Texaco Corporation.
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CHAPTER V
RESULTS
Chapter V presents the findings of the event study. First, cumulative abnormal
returns and test-statistics are presented for each event window. Next, the
acquisitions were characterized by transaction value and industry to determine if
these variables impacted the wealth effects of the acquisition. Finally, regression
analyses were completed to examine the relationship between the acquisition
announcement cumulative abnormal returns, as well as acquirer characteristics.
A. Cumulative Abnormal Returns
As discussed earlier, cumulative abnormal returns is a metric utilized in an event
study to evaluate the effect of a deal on a company’s stock during the event window.
It demonstrates the differences between the expected return and the actual return
of the company’s stock resulting from the acquisition announcement. Test statistics
for each acquisition’s cumulative abnormal returns were calculated to determine
whether the cumulative abnormal returns experienced by the company were
significantly different from zero. Table 2 displays the cumulative abnormal returns
and test-statistics for the event window measuring the immediate effect (-2 days to
+2 days) of the deal announcement.
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Table 2: CAR for Immediate Event Window
Company
Procter & Gamble Co
SBC Communications Inc
Boston Scientific Corp
Duke Energy Corp
Federated Department Stores (M)
ChevronTexaco Corp
Bank of America Corp
MetLife Inc
Verizon Communications Inc
Cisco Systems Inc
Boeing Co
Capital One Financial Corp
Thermo Electron Corp
Motorola Inc
Home Depot Inc
Bank of America Corp
Johnson & Johnson
Rite Aid Corp
Walt Disney Co
CVS Corp
Coca-Cola Co
Transocean Inc
National Oilwell Varco Inc
Oracle Corp
Microsoft Corp
Bank of America Corp
Cisco Systems Inc
UnitedHealth Group Inc
IHOP Corp
Berkshire Hathaway Inc
Hewlett Packard Co
The JM Smucker Co
The Dow Chemical Co
CVS Health Corp
CME Group Inc
International Paper Co
Boston Properties Inc
Wells Fargo & Co
Brocade Commun Sys Inc
Verizon Wireless Inc
Oracle Corp
DirecTV Group Inc (ATT)
MetLife Inc
Exxon Mobil Corp
Comcast Corp
Simon Property Group Inc
Walt Disney Co
Xerox Corp
Pfizer Inc
Express Scripts Inc
Average CAR for Sample

CAR
-6.592%
-1.430%
-1.253%
-5.694%
5.394%
-2.414%
-4.113%
-3.469%
-0.546%
-2.393%
0.345%
-5.356%
-2.036%
3.984%
4.842%
-0.858%
-4.059%
-4.168%
-3.932%
-8.299%
2.549%
8.599%
-5.795%
-2.657%
-1.970%
-2.563%
0.643%
-0.638%
12.853%
3.535%
-6.559%
-0.264%
-6.895%
0.011%
-5.052%
-14.759%
-0.470%
20.842%
-25.954%
2.179%
3.971%
0.581%
-11.400%
-7.042%
16.778%
0.972%
-2.704%
-17.273%
-16.278%
18.211%
-1.572%

T-Statistic
-3.500**

-0.3181
-0.247
-1.994**

0.694
-0.361
-1.632
-1.598
-0.895
-0.908
0.135
-0.551
-0.665
2.191**

1.61
-0.908
-2.326**

-0.321
-1.184
-1.151
2.183**
1.802*

-0.699
-0.987
-1.212
-1.467
0.365
-0.229
1.512
1.078
-0.731
-0.085
-1.436
0.005
-0.923
-1.455
-0.199
2.361**

-1.116
0.486
1.113
0.377
-8.581**

-1.564
1.931*

0.216
-0.976
-0.995
-1.473
1.044

**Significant at the .05 level, *Significant at the .10 level
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Table 2 shows 33 of the 50, or 66%, of acquisitions led to some level of
negative cumulative abnormal returns for the buying company. Negative cumulative
abnormal returns demonstrate a negative stock market reaction, and could indicate
investor concerns about the “expected value resulting from future synergies or
wealth redistribution among stakeholders” (Campa and Hernando, 2004, 47). Of the
33 acquisitions that realized negative cumulative abnormal returns, four companies
had cumulative abnormal returns significant at the .05 level during the event
window. These companies include Proctor & Gamble Co, Duke Energy Corp, MetLife
Inc., and Johnson & Johnson. MetLife Inc.’s shareholders experienced the most
substantial negatives returns when compared to the expected return. The teststatistic for this acquisition was equal to
-8.581, which demonstrates the high level of confidence that the null hypothesis,
which states cumulative abnormal returns are not equal to zero, is false.
Furthermore, Table 2 reports that 17, or 33%, of acquiring companies
realized positive cumulative abnormal returns following the purchase of another
company. This suggests a positive market reaction, and shareholders’ positive
expectations for the acquisition. Of the 17 acquisitions, three had cumulative
abnormal returns significant at the .05 level. The acquiring companies in these
acquisitions are Coca-Cola Co., Motorola Inc., and Wells Fargo & Co. An additional
two acquisitions experienced cumulative abnormal returns that were significant at
the .10 level for shareholders. The buying companies in these deals involved
Transocean Inc. and Comcast Corporation.
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A similar analysis of cumulative abnormal returns was conducted to assess
the short-term (-30 days to +30 days) wealth effects a result of the deal
announcement. Table 3 reports the cumulative abnormal returns and test statistics
for each acquiring company during this event window.
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Table 3: CAR for Short-Term Event Window
Company
Procter & Gamble Co
SBC Communications Inc
Boston Scientific Corp
Duke Energy Corp
Federated Dept. Stores
ChevronTexaco Corp
Bank of America Corp
MetLife Inc
Verizon Communications Inc
Cisco Systems Inc
Boeing Co
Capital One Financial Corp
Thermo Electron Corp
Motorola Inc
Home Depot Inc
Bank of America Corp
Johnson & Johnson
Rite Aid Corp
Walt Disney Co
CVS Corp
Coca-Cola Co
Transocean Inc
National Oilwell Varco Inc
Oracle Corp
Microsoft Corp
Bank of America Corp
Cisco Systems Inc
UnitedHealth Group Inc
IHOP Corp
Berkshire Hathaway Inc
Hewlett Packard Co
The JM Smucker Co
The Dow Chemical Co
CVS Health Corp
CME Group Inc
International Paper Co
Boston Properties Inc
Wells Fargo & Co
Brocade Commun Sys Inc
Verizon Wireless Inc
Oracle Corp
DirecTV Group Inc
MetLife Inc
Exxon Mobil Corp
Comcast Corp
Simon Property Group Inc
Walt Disney Co
Xerox Corp
Pfizer Inc
Express Scripts Inc
Average CAR for Sample

CAR
2.259%
-5.810%
8.782%
-2.081%
1.108%
-2.118%
-11.528%
-1.690%
-9.565%
4.296%
1.835%
-0.981%
-12.542%
-1.923%
3.465%
-10.434%
14.104%
-17.201%
14.240%
-34.122%
3.225%
3.708%
-35.346%
3.375%
3.812%
-0.357%
-11.020%
9.636%
10.069%
0.680%
6.009%
-8.721%
-17.139%
-16.659%
-25.498%
-11.688%
-5.641%
67.610%
-12.588%
20.169%
-2.752%
-19.188%
-24.917%
-0.577%
-2.788%
-4.654%
-9.929%
-34.209%
-23.881%
3.932%
-3.905%

T-Statistic
0.326
-0.999
0.719
-0.34
0.092
-0.193
-2.441**
-0.231
-1.379
0.506
0.215
-0.084
-1.65*
-0.179
0.419
-2.184**
2.532**
-0.918
1.339
-1.981**
0.685
0.289
-1.407
0.26
0.646
-0.072
-1.46
0.909
0.718
0.054
0.531
-0.67
-1.739
-1.548
-1.052
-0.744
-0.509
1.884*
-0.424
2.186**
-0.165
-1.851*
-1.674*
-0.087
-0.199
-0.356
-0.975
-1.547
-1.467
0.154

**Significant at the .05 level, significant at the .10 level

As seen in Table 3, 31 acquisitions resulted in negative cumulative abnormal
returns during the short-term event window. Of the 31 acquisitions, five companies
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realized cumulative abnormal returns that were statistically significant from zero.
These companies included Bank of America (both acquisitions in the sample),
Thermo Electron Corp, CVS Corporation, Direct TV Group, and MetLife Inc. It is
important to note that the only acquisition that had significant negative cumulative
abnormal returns in both event windows is MetLife Inc. When compared with the
cumulative abnormal returns experienced by the companies during the immediate
event window, there are two fewer companies in the sample that had negative
cumulative abnormal returns. Although there were fewer acquisitions that resulted
in negative cumulative abnormal returns in the short-term event window, there was
an additional company that experienced statistically significant cumulative
abnormal returns. Furthermore, through the comparison of the average of
cumulative abnormal returns for the entire sample for the different event windows,
it is evident the cumulative abnormal returns realized in the short-term event
window were of a larger magnitude than the cumulative abnormal returns in the
immediate event window. The immediate event window’s average cumulative
abnormal is equal to -1.572%, whereas the average for the short-term event
window is -3.905%. This highlights substantial intensification in magnitude of the
negative cumulative abnormal returns realized by the companies in the short-term
event window. Possible explanations for this could be poor integration strategies or
investors’ belief that the buying company will not be better off as a result of the
acquisition.
Moreover, Table 3 reports that 19 of the acquiring companies realized
positive cumulative abnormal returns in the 60 days surrounding the deal
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announcement. Of these companies, three had statistically significant cumulative
abnormal returns. These companies include Johnson & Johnson, Wells Fargo & Co,
and Verizon Wireless Inc. Wells Fargo is the only company to experience cumulative
abnormal returns statistically significant from zero during both event windows.
Furthermore, Johnson & Johnson realized significant negative cumulative abnormal
returns during the immediate event window, but significant positive cumulative
abnormal returns in the short-term event window, indicating the market’s response
can vary greatly between event windows.
In addition to assessing the cumulative abnormal returns of each individual
acquisition, it can be beneficial to determine whether the entire sample of
acquisitions experienced cumulative abnormal returns at a statistically significant
level. If the entire sample was significant, it would demonstrate that when the
cumulative abnormal returns of all 50 study acquisitions were averaged, they were
statistically different from zero. To evaluate whether the cumulative abnormal
returns were significant for the entire sample of acquisitions, a t-test on average
cumulative abnormal returns was run.
The following estimation model was used to run the regression:
𝐶𝐴𝑅! = ∝! +∈!
Table 4 displays the regression analysis for the entire sample of acquisitions.
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Table 4: Regression Analysis for Immediate Event Window

Variable

Coefficient

Constant

-0.0157
(0.012)

Observations
R-squared
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

50
0.000

As shown in Table 4, the negative coefficient implies that when averaged
together, the cumulative abnormal returns realized by the 50 acquiring companies
were negative however the cumulative abnormal returns for entire sample were not
statistically different from zero during the immediate event window. The extremely
low r-squared suggests there is a large amount of unexplained variation within the
sample. In the context of this research, it indicates there is a vast amount of variance
amongst the cumulative abnormal returns that the acquiring companies experience.
Table 5 displays the regression analysis of cumulative abnormal returns for
the entire sample during the short-term event window
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Table 5: Regression Analysis for Short-Term Event Window

Variable

Coefficient

Constant

-0.0390
(0.0229)

Observations
R-squared
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

50
0.000

Table 5 shows the cumulative abnormal returns for the entire sample were
not statistically significant during the short-term event window. Similar to the
immediate event window, the companies in the sample on average experienced
negative cumulative abnormal returns, which is indicated by the negative
coefficient. Furthermore, the comparison of the negative coefficients of the
regression analyses of both event windows underpins the assertion that the
companies realized more negative cumulative abnormal returns in the short-term
event window than the immediate event window.
Although it would be beneficial to continue the evaluation of the cumulative
abnormal returns for both event windows, the rest of this analysis will only focus on
the cumulative abnormal returns realized in the immediate event window. It is
recommended for future research to evaluate the wealth effects of mergers and
acquisitions on companies during multiple event windows.
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B. Evaluation of Impact of Transaction Value on CAR
In addition to evaluating whether cumulative abnormal returns were significant
for each acquiring company, this study examined the roles of specific variables that
have historically been known to cause variances in returns. The first characteristic
of the acquisitions tested was transaction value. Transaction value indicates the size
and magnitude of the acquisition, and can presumably affect the market’s response
to a merger or acquisition announcement. Although the sample was limited to
acquisitions with transaction values over $1.5 billion, there is still a large variance in
acquisition size within the sample. This is evidenced by the smallest transaction size
being equal to $1.931 billion, and the largest equaling $67.286 billion. Tables 6 and
7 display the sample of acquisitions in ascending order of transaction value. Panel A
includes the lowest ten transaction values from the sample. Panel B includes the
second quintile; Panel C includes the third quintile, and Panels D and E are
comprised of the 20 highest transaction values. As demonstrated in Panel A of Table
6, none of the acquisitions with the ten lowest transaction values resulted in
statistically significant cumulative abnormal returns. Furthermore, of the next ten
acquisitions in Panel B, two acquisitions have cumulative abnormal returns
significant at the .05 significance level. These acquisitions have transaction values of
$3.88 billion and $4.1 billion. In Panel C, which covers acquisitions with transaction
values between $7 billion and $11.7 billion, one acquisition had cumulative
abnormal returns that were significant at the .05 significance level. In Panel D, four
acquisitions had statistically significant cumulative abnormal returns. Three
acquisitions, which had transaction values of $15.11 billion, $15.54 billion, and
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$16.6 billion, were significant at the .05 level. One acquisition, with a transaction
value of $17.30 billion, was significant at the .10 level. Finally, in Panel E, which
contains the largest acquisitions, two acquisitions had cumulative abnormal returns
that were significant. An acquisition with a transaction value of $23.5 billion
experienced positive cumulative abnormal returns that were significant at the .10
significance level, and an acquisition with a transaction value of $59.01 billion
realized negative cumulative abnormal returns at the .05 significance level.
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Table 6: Differences in CAR by Transaction Value

Company

Transaction
Value

CAR

T-Statistic

IHOP Corp
Boeing Co
Simon Property Group Inc
Brocade Commun Sys Inc
UnitedHealth Group Inc
CVS Health Corp
Cisco Systems Inc
Bank of America Corp
The JM Smucker Co
Rite Aid Corp

1,931.602
2,057.10
2,325.00
2,410.448
2,425.343
2,637.421
3,090.519
3,300.00
3,300.00
3,470.00

12.853%
0.345%
0.972%
-25.954%
-0.638%
0.011%
0.643%
-0.858%
-0.264%
-4.168%

1.511
0.135
0.216
-1.116
-0.229
0.005
0.365
-0.908
-0.085
-0.321

Home Depot Inc
Motorola Inc
Boston Properties Inc
Walt Disney Co
Coca-Cola Co
Berkshire Hathaway Inc
Express Scripts Inc
International Paper Co
Microsoft Corp
Cisco Systems Inc

3,475.355
3,880.468
3,949.00
3,958.354
4,100.00
4,500.00
4,675.00
6,000.00
6,333.117
6,865.722

4.842%
3.984%
-0.470%
-2.704%
2.549%
3.535%
18.211%
-14.759%
-1.970%
-2.393%

1.61
2.191**
-0.199
-0.976
2.183**
1.078
1.044
-1.455
-1.212
-0.908

Oracle Corp
National Oilwell Varco Inc
Walt Disney Co
CME Group Inc
Oracle Corp

7,305.203
7,513.454
7,531.739
7,555.372
8,056.049

Xerox Corp
Verizon Communications
Duke Energy Corp
Thermo Electron Corp
MetLife Inc

8,374.197
8,495.595
8,832.943
10,291.785
11,694.656

3.971%
-5.795%
-3.932%
-5.052%
-2.657%
-17.273%
-0.546%
-5.694%
-2.036%
-3.469%

1.113
-0.699
-1.184
-0.923
-0.987
-0.995
-0.895
-1.994**
-0.665
-1.598

PANEL A

PANEL B

PANEL C

**Significant at the .05 level, *Significant at the .10 level
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Table 7: Differences in CAR by Transaction Value (contd.)

Company

Transaction
Value

CAR

T-Statistic

Hewlett Packard Co
SBC Communications Inc
Wells Fargo & Co
Capital One Financial Corp
DirecTV Group Inc (ATT)
The Dow Chemical Co
MetLife Inc
Federated Department Stores
Johnson & Johnson
Transocean Inc

12,565.034
14,732.64
15,112.754
15,132.87
15,243.05
15,513.132
15,543.544
16,465.871
16,600.00
17,298.661

-6.559%
-1.430%
20.842%
-5.356%
0.581%
-6.895%
-11.400%
5.394%
-4.059%
8.599%

-0.731
-0.318
2.361**
-0.551
0.377
-1.436
-8.581**
0.694
-2.326**
1.802*

ChevronTexaco Corp
Bank of America Corp
Comcast Corp
CVS Corp
Boston Scientific Corp
Verizon Wireless Inc
Bank of America Corp
Exxon Mobil Corp
Procter & Gamble Co
Pfizer Inc

18,718.509
21,000.00
23,500.00
26,293.576
27,861.289
28,100.00
35,810.268
40,298.142
54,906.807
67,285.695

-2.414%
-2.563%
16.778%
-8.299%
-1.253%
2.179%
-4.113%
-7.042%
-6.592%
-16.278%

-0.361
-1.467
1.931*
-1.151
-0.247
0.486
-1.632
-1.564
-3.500**
-1.473

PANEL D

PANEL E

**Significant at the .05 level, *Significant at the .10 level

From the analysis of Tables 6 and 7, it is apparent that six of the nine
statistically significant (at the .05 or .10 levels) acquisitions, or 66%, have
transaction values that are amongst the highest twenty (Panels D and E) with four of
the six having negative CAR values. This would suggest that acquisitions with higher
transaction values are more likely to result in lower cumulative abnormal returns.
To determine if the size of the transaction is correlated with the acquiring
firm’s cumulative abnormal returns during the event period, a linear regression was
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run with transaction value as the dependent value, and cumulative abnormal
returns as the dependent variable for the sample of 50 acquisitions.
The following estimation model was used:
𝐶𝐴𝑅! = ∝ + 𝛽! 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 + ∈!
Table 8 displays the regression output.
Table 8: Regression Analysis of Transaction Value

Variables

Coefficient

Transaction Value

-0.0013*
(0.001)

Constant

0.0011
(0.016)

Observations
R-squared
Robust standard errors in parentheses

50
0.043

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 8 shows the coefficient on transaction value of the acquisitions has a
statistically significant negative correlation with cumulative abnormal returns. This
indicates that as transaction value increases, cumulative abnormal returns are likely
to become more negative. This relationship is displayed in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Transaction Value vs. Cumulative Abnormal Returns
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Figure 2 demonstrates that, while there are outliers present and some
unexplained variation indicated by a low r-squared, a downward trend is evident.
This is a noteworthy observation, as it appears that the largest acquisitions, defined
by transaction size, resulted in value destruction for shareholders.
C. Evaluation of Impact of Company Industry on CAR
In addition to evaluating the role that transaction value plays in the
cumulative abnormal returns realized by acquiring firms, the company industry can
also be considered. For this thesis, the companies fell into seven major industries.
Table 9 displays the company name, the respective industry, cumulative abnormal
return, and the test statistic for each acquisition that falls under the consumer retail,
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energy service, health care/life sciences, industrial goods, and real
estate/gaming/leisure industries.
Table 9: Differences in CAR by Industry
Company
Industry
CAR
CVS Health Corp
Consumer Retail
0.011%
The JM Smucker Group
Consumer Retail
-0.264%
Rite Aid Corp
Consumer Retail
-4.168%
Home Depot Inc
Consumer Retail
4.842%
Coca-Cola Inc
Consumer Retail
2.549%
International Paper Co
Consumer Retail
-14.759%
Federated Dept. Stores
Consumer Retail
5.394%
CVS Corp
Consumer Retail
-8.299%
Proctor & Gamble Co
Consumer Retail
-6.592%
National Oilwell Varco Inc
Energy Service
-5.795%
Duke Energy Corp
Energy Service
-5.694%
Transocean Inc
Energy Service
8.599%
Chevron Texaco Corp
Energy Service
-2.414%
Exxon Mobil Corp
Energy Service
-7.042%
UnitedHealth Group Inc Health Care/Life Sciences
-0.638%
Express Scripts Inc
Health Care/Life Sciences
18.211%
Thermo Electron Corp
Health Care/Life Sciences
-2.036%
Johnson & Johnson
Health Care/Life Sciences
-4.059%
Boston Scientific Corp
Health Care/Life Sciences
-1.253%
Pfizer Inc
Health Care/Life Sciences
-16.278%
Boeing Co
Industrial Goods
0.345%
The Dow Chemical Co
Industrial Goods
-6.895%
IHOP Corp
Real Estate/Gaming/Lesiure
12.853%
Simon Property Group Inc Real Estate/Gaming/Lesiure
0.972%
Boston Properties Inc
Real Estate/Gaming/Lesiure
-0.470%
**Significant at the .05 level, *Significant at the .10 level

T-Statistic
0.005
-0.085
-0.321
1.61
2.183**
-1.455
0.694
-1.151
-3.5**
-0.699
-1.994**
1.802*
-0.361
-1.564
-0.229
1.044
-0.665
-2.326**
-0.247
-1.473
0.135
-1.436
1.512
0.216
-0.199

Table 10 reports the company name, industry, cumulative abnormal return,
and the test statistic for each acquisition that falls under the financial services and
technology/media/telecommunications industries.
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Table 10: Differences in CAR by Industry
Company
Bank of America Corp
Berkshire Hathaway Inc
CME Group Inc
MetLife Inc
Wells Fargo & Co
Capital One Financial Corp
MetLife Inc
Bank of America Corp
Bank of America Corp
Brocade Commun Sys Inc
Cisco Systems Inc
Motorola Inc
Walt Disney Co
Microsoft Corp
Cisco Systems Inc
Oracle Corp
Walt Disney Co
Oracle Corp
Xerox Corp
Verizon Communications
Hewlett Packard Co
SBC Communications Inc
DirecTV Group Inc
Comcast Corp
Verizon Wireless Inc

Industry
Financial Services
Financial Services
Financial Services
Financial Services
Financial Services
Financial Services
Financial Services
Financial Services
Financial Services
Technology/Media/Telecom
Technology/Media/Telecom
Technology/Media/Telecom
Technology/Media/Telecom
Technology/Media/Telecom
Technology/Media/Telecom
Technology/Media/Telecom
Technology/Media/Telecom
Technology/Media/Telecom
Technology/Media/Telecom
Technology/Media/Telecom
Technology/Media/Telecom
Technology/Media/Telecom
Technology/Media/Telecom
Technology/Media/Telecom
Technology/Media/Telecom

CAR
-0.858%
3.535%
-5.052%
-3.469%
20.842%
-5.356%
-11.400%
-2.563%
-4.113%
-25.954%
0.643%
3.984%
-2.704%
-1.970%
-2.393%
3.971%
-3.932%
-2.657%
-17.273%
-0.546%
-6.559%
-1.430%
0.581%
16.778%
2.179%

T-Statistic
-0.908
1.078
-0.923
-1.598
2.361**
-0.551
-8.58**
-1.467
-1.632
-1.116
0.365
2.191**
-0.976
-1.212
-0.908
1.113
-1.184
-0.987
-0.995
-0.895
-0.731
-0.318
0.377
1.931*
0.486

**Significant at the .05 level, *Significant at the .10 level

As seen in Tables 9 and 10, acquisitions with cumulative abnormal returns
statistically different from zero are distributed across five of the seven industries.
These include: consumer retail, energy service, health care/life sciences, financial
services, and technology/media/telecommunications. Thus, none of the acquisitions
in the industrial goods and real estate/gaming/leisure industries had statistically
significant cumulative abnormal returns. The consumer retail and financial services
industries had the highest number of statistically significant acquisitions with two,
which were all significant at the .05 level. The acquiring firms in the consumer retail
industry are Coca-Cola Co and Proctor & Gamble Co. For the financial services
industry, Wells Fargo & Co and MetLife Inc. were the buying companies with
significant cumulative abnormal returns. Each had nine acquisitions in the
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respective industries, which equates to 22% of the acquisitions in consumer retail
and financial services having significant cumulative abnormal returns. Furthermore,
these industries account for 44% of all statistically significant acquisitions. Health
care/life sciences has one acquisition with significant cumulative abnormal returns
at the .05 level, which was Johnson & Johnson. In addition, energy service also had
one acquisition with cumulative abnormal returns, which was for Duke Energy
Corporation. These industries each account for 11.1% of the overall sample of
statistically significant acquisitions.
Further analysis was completed to determine whether a company’s industry
is a significant variable in determining the cumulative abnormal return an acquiring
company will realize following an acquisition. A regression was run with industry as
the independent variables and cumulative abnormal returns as the dependent
variable. Industry dummy variables were used for the regression to allow for the
analysis of each industry.
The following estimation model was used for the regression:
𝐶𝐴𝑅! = ∝! + 𝛽! 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙 + 𝛽! 𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒 + 𝛽! 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑐𝑒𝑠
+ 𝐵! 𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ 𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑒 & 𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑒 𝑆𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠 + 𝛽! 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑠
+ 𝛽! 𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 & 𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔 & 𝐿𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒
+ 𝛽! 𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦 & 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎 & 𝑇𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 + ∈!
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Table 11 displays the regression output for company industry and cumulative
abnormal returns.
Table 11: Regression Analysis of Company Industry

Coefficient

Robust Std.
Error

Energy Service

-0.001

0.0358

Financial Services

0.0143

0.0382

Health Care/Life Sciences

0.0136

0.4992

Industrial Goods

-0.0091

0.0357

Real Estate/Gaming/Leisure

0.0682

0.0435

Technology/Media/Telecommunications

0.0004

0.0331

Constant

-0.0237

0.0226

INDUSTRY

Observations
R-squared
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Consumer Retail Industry omitted

50
0.041

Table 11 demonstrates there is no significant correlation between a
company’s industry and cumulative abnormal returns. This is further supported by
the coefficients of each industry, as they are very low in magnitude.
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D. Conclusion
Through an in-depth analysis of the data and results, it is evident that on
average, the sample of acquisitions resulted in negative cumulative abnormal
returns for the acquiring firm’s shareholders. While the entire sample did not
experience significant cumulative abnormal results resulting from an event
announcement, there were nine acquisitions that realized statistically significant
cumulative abnormal returns during both the immediate and short-term event
windows. Furthermore, it was found that there is a significant negative correlation
between the transaction value of acquisitions and cumulative abnormal returns. The
conclusions drawn about the relationship between event announcements and
cumulative abnormal returns to the shareholders of the acquiring firms are
consistent with previous literature on mergers and acquisitions that find acquiring
firms experience insignificant, but often negative returns resulting from a deal.
Furthermore, they demonstrate the necessity of further research on factors that
influence the wealth effects of mergers and acquisitions to buying firms.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
A. Summary of Findings
Mergers and acquisitions remain the primary means of corporate growth for
companies seeking to generate inorganic growth. While their popularity is on the
rise, the performance of deals is mixed. Prior research on mergers and acquisitions
has relied on the response of the stock market to indicate the wealth effects that
arise from a deal. The stock market reaction following a merger or acquisition
announcement represents the changes in expected returns, or future cash flows,
that will be realized by the shareholders of the involved firms. Thus, the market
reaction serves as a proxy for the expected value investors believe will result from a
deal. In this thesis, I evaluated the value generated to shareholders by US
acquisitions and mergers announced between 2005 and 2009. Utilizing event study
methodology, two event windows centered around the announcement date were
constructed and cumulative abnormal returns were analyzed.
Through a comprehensive analysis of the data, the following conclusions were
reached. First, it was found that a majority (over 60%) of acquisitions led to
negative cumulative abnormal returns for the shareholders in both event windows.
Of this majority, only less than five acquisitions led to CARs that were statistically
different from zero. Therefore, it can be concluded that merger and acquisition
announcements led to insignificant cumulative abnormal returns, which were more
than likely negative for the shareholders of the acquiring firms. When comparing the
cumulative abnormal returns of the immediate event window (-2 days to +2 days)
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and the short-term event window (-30 days to +30 days), it was found that
shareholders of the acquiring firms experienced cumulative abnormal returns that
were of a higher magnitude during the short-term event window. Possible
explanations for this could be that over a longer period of time, investors’
confidence about the expected value generated by the deal decreases. Another
conclusion drawn from the analysis of data is there are characteristics of mergers
and acquisitions that are related to the deal’s performance. This thesis examined
two of those characteristics: transaction value and industry. Transaction value had a
significant, negative correlation with cumulative abnormal returns indicating that as
transaction value increases, cumulative abnormal returns were likely to become
more negative. Furthermore, it was concluded that company industry did not have
any significant correlation with cumulative abnormal returns.
B. Limitations of Research
This thesis examines the value generated resulting from a merger or
acquisition announced between 2005 and 2009 involving US firms. It focuses
primarily on the market’s reaction to the announcement and consequently how
shareholders are impacted. While this is indicative of what investors believe the
expected value will be resulting from the deal, there are multiple other
stakeholders affected by a merger or acquisition. Possible stakeholders include
employees of the firms and customers. This thesis neglects to evaluate the value
returned to these groups, and is thus not a complete analysis of the deal’s
performance.
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Furthermore, this thesis evaluated 50 US mergers and acquisitions that
occurred between 2005 and 2009. There are two implications of the sample
used: size and time period. First, the sample size was very small, and therefore
may not accurately represent the wealth effects of the population of mergers and
acquisitions. In addition, it can be more difficult to detect significance in a
sample when it is small. This could result in significant differences among the
data going unnoticed. In addition to the size of the sample, the time period from
which the data was collected likely has implications. The time period 2005-2009
was chosen based on the lack of available data for the analysis, but includes the
financial crisis of 2008, which had substantial and widespread detrimental
effects on the stock market. While it can be assumed that all companies in the
sample were negatively impacted by the financial crisis, there are some
industries that were likely affected more than others. It is difficult to control for
these confounding effects, which may have skewed the data in a particular
direction.
C. Suggestions for Future Research
There are multiple possible avenues for future merger and acquisition
research. One possible approach would be to evaluate the value generated from
a deal through multiple event windows. This thesis looked at an immediate
window and a short-term window centered around the deal announcement, and
found a substantial difference in the returns realized by shareholders. It would
be valuable to examine this variance more carefully, and expand it to other event
windows as well to identify what factors drive the differences in value created
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over varied time periods. Another potential avenue for future research would be
to examine the effects of mergers and acquisitions in different countries. This
thesis limited the sample to include only deals involving US companies, but it
could be interesting to determine if the value generated by deals varies across
countries as a result of regulation, investor perceptions, or other reasons. A final
suggestion for future research involves broadening the value analysis to groups
other than shareholders. This could provide a more comprehensive
understanding of how mergers and acquisitions impact different stakeholders,
and provide a more thorough examination of the value generated by mergers
and acquisitions.
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TABLES AND FIGURES
Table 1: Distribution of Sample Across Industries

58

Table 2: CAR for Immediate Event Window
Company
Procter & Gamble Co
SBC Communications Inc
Boston Scientific Corp
Duke Energy Corp
Federated Department Stores (M)
ChevronTexaco Corp
Bank of America Corp
MetLife Inc
Verizon Communications Inc
Cisco Systems Inc
Boeing Co
Capital One Financial Corp
Thermo Electron Corp
Motorola Inc
Home Depot Inc
Bank of America Corp
Johnson & Johnson
Rite Aid Corp
Walt Disney Co
CVS Corp
Coca-Cola Co
Transocean Inc
National Oilwell Varco Inc
Oracle Corp
Microsoft Corp
Bank of America Corp
Cisco Systems Inc
UnitedHealth Group Inc
IHOP Corp
Berkshire Hathaway Inc
Hewlett Packard Co
The JM Smucker Co
The Dow Chemical Co
CVS Health Corp
CME Group Inc
International Paper Co
Boston Properties Inc
Wells Fargo & Co
Brocade Commun Sys Inc
Verizon Wireless Inc
Oracle Corp
DirecTV Group Inc (ATT)
MetLife Inc
Exxon Mobil Corp
Comcast Corp
Simon Property Group Inc
Walt Disney Co
Xerox Corp
Pfizer Inc
Express Scripts Inc
Average CAR for Sample
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CAR
-6.592%
-1.430%
-1.253%
-5.694%
5.394%
-2.414%
-4.113%
-3.469%
-0.546%
-2.393%
0.345%
-5.356%
-2.036%
3.984%
4.842%
-0.858%
-4.059%
-4.168%
-3.932%
-8.299%
2.549%
8.599%
-5.795%
-2.657%
-1.970%
-2.563%
0.643%
-0.638%
12.853%
3.535%
-6.559%
-0.264%
-6.895%
0.011%
-5.052%
-14.759%
-0.470%
20.842%
-25.954%
2.179%
3.971%
0.581%
-11.400%
-7.042%
16.778%
0.972%
-2.704%
-17.273%
-16.278%
18.211%
-1.572%

T-Statistic
-3.500**

-0.3181
-0.247
-1.994**

0.694
-0.361
-1.632
-1.598
-0.895
-0.908
0.135
-0.551
-0.665
2.191**

1.61
-0.908
-2.326**

-0.321
-1.184
-1.151
2.183**
1.802*

-0.699
-0.987
-1.212
-1.467
0.365
-0.229
1.512
1.078
-0.731
-0.085
-1.436
0.005
-0.923
-1.455
-0.199
2.361**

-1.116
0.486
1.113
0.377
-8.581**

-1.564
1.931*

0.216
-0.976
-0.995
-1.473
1.044

Table 3: CAR for Short-Term Event Window
Company
Procter & Gamble Co
SBC Communications Inc
Boston Scientific Corp
Duke Energy Corp
Federated Dept. Stores
ChevronTexaco Corp
Bank of America Corp
MetLife Inc
Verizon Communications Inc
Cisco Systems Inc
Boeing Co
Capital One Financial Corp
Thermo Electron Corp
Motorola Inc
Home Depot Inc
Bank of America Corp
Johnson & Johnson
Rite Aid Corp
Walt Disney Co
CVS Corp
Coca-Cola Co
Transocean Inc
National Oilwell Varco Inc
Oracle Corp
Microsoft Corp
Bank of America Corp
Cisco Systems Inc
UnitedHealth Group Inc
IHOP Corp
Berkshire Hathaway Inc
Hewlett Packard Co
The JM Smucker Co
The Dow Chemical Co
CVS Health Corp
CME Group Inc
International Paper Co
Boston Properties Inc
Wells Fargo & Co
Brocade Commun Sys Inc
Verizon Wireless Inc
Oracle Corp
DirecTV Group Inc
MetLife Inc
Exxon Mobil Corp
Comcast Corp
Simon Property Group Inc
Walt Disney Co
Xerox Corp
Pfizer Inc
Express Scripts Inc
Average CAR for Sample

CAR
2.259%
-5.810%
8.782%
-2.081%
1.108%
-2.118%
-11.528%
-1.690%
-9.565%
4.296%
1.835%
-0.981%
-12.542%
-1.923%
3.465%
-10.434%
14.104%
-17.201%
14.240%
-34.122%
3.225%
3.708%
-35.346%
3.375%
3.812%
-0.357%
-11.020%
9.636%
10.069%
0.680%
6.009%
-8.721%
-17.139%
-16.659%
-25.498%
-11.688%
-5.641%
67.610%
-12.588%
20.169%
-2.752%
-19.188%
-24.917%
-0.577%
-2.788%
-4.654%
-9.929%
-34.209%
-23.881%
3.932%
-3.905%
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T-Statistic
0.326
-0.999
0.719
-0.34
0.092
-0.193
-2.441**
-0.231
-1.379
0.506
0.215
-0.084
-1.65*
-0.179
0.419
-2.184**
2.532**
-0.918
1.339
-1.981**
0.685
0.289
-1.407
0.26
0.646
-0.072
-1.46
0.909
0.718
0.054
0.531
-0.67
-1.739
-1.548
-1.052
-0.744
-0.509
1.884*
-0.424
2.186**
-0.165
-1.851*
-1.674*
-0.087
-0.199
-0.356
-0.975
-1.547
-1.467
0.154

Table 4: Regression Analysis of CAR for Immediate Event Window

Variable

Coefficient

Constant

-0.0157
(0.012)

Observations
50
R-squared
0.000
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 5: Regression Analysis of CAR for Short-Term Event Window

Variable

Coefficient

Constant

-0.0390
(0.0229)

Observations
R-squared
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

50
0.000
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Table 6: Differences in CAR by Transaction Value

Company

Transaction
Value

CAR

T-Statistic

IHOP Corp
Boeing Co
Simon Property Group Inc
Brocade Commun Sys Inc
UnitedHealth Group Inc
CVS Health Corp
Cisco Systems Inc
Bank of America Corp
The JM Smucker Co
Rite Aid Corp

1,931.602
2,057.10
2,325.00
2,410.448
2,425.343
2,637.421
3,090.519
3,300.00
3,300.00
3,470.00

12.853%
0.345%
0.972%
-25.954%
-0.638%
0.011%
0.643%
-0.858%
-0.264%
-4.168%

1.511
0.135
0.216
-1.116
-0.229
0.005
0.365
-0.908
-0.085
-0.321

Home Depot Inc
Motorola Inc
Boston Properties Inc
Walt Disney Co
Coca-Cola Co
Berkshire Hathaway Inc
Express Scripts Inc
International Paper Co
Microsoft Corp
Cisco Systems Inc

3,475.355
3,880.468
3,949.00
3,958.354
4,100.00
4,500.00
4,675.00
6,000.00
6,333.117
6,865.722

4.842%
3.984%
-0.470%
-2.704%
2.549%
3.535%
18.211%
-14.759%
-1.970%
-2.393%

1.61
2.191**
-0.199
-0.976
2.183**
1.078
1.044
-1.455
-1.212
-0.908

Oracle Corp
National Oilwell Varco Inc
Walt Disney Co
CME Group Inc
Oracle Corp
Xerox Corp
Verizon Communications
Duke Energy Corp
Thermo Electron Corp
MetLife Inc

7,305.203
7,513.454
7,531.739
7,555.372
8,056.049
8,374.197
8,495.595
8,832.943
10,291.785
11,694.656

3.971%
-5.795%
-3.932%
-5.052%
-2.657%
-17.273%
-0.546%
-5.694%
-2.036%
-3.469%

1.113
-0.699
-1.184
-0.923
-0.987
-0.995
-0.895
-1.994**
-0.665
-1.598

PANEL A

PANEL B

PANEL C
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Table 7: Differences in CAR by Transaction Value (contd.)
Company

Transaction
Value

CAR

T-Statistic

Hewlett Packard Co
SBC Communications Inc
Wells Fargo & Co
Capital One Financial Corp
DirecTV Group Inc (ATT)
The Dow Chemical Co
MetLife Inc
Federated Department Stores
Johnson & Johnson
Transocean Inc

12,565.034
14,732.64
15,112.754
15,132.87
15,243.05
15,513.132
15,543.544
16,465.871
16,600.00
17,298.661

-6.559%
-1.430%
20.842%
-5.356%
0.581%
-6.895%
-11.400%
5.394%
-4.059%
8.599%

-0.731
-0.318
2.361**
-0.551
0.377
-1.436
-8.581**
0.694
-2.326**
1.802*

ChevronTexaco Corp
Bank of America Corp
Comcast Corp
CVS Corp
Boston Scientific Corp
Verizon Wireless Inc
Bank of America Corp
Exxon Mobil Corp
Procter & Gamble Co
Pfizer Inc

18,718.509
21,000.00
23,500.00
26,293.576
27,861.289
28,100.00
35,810.268
40,298.142
54,906.807
67,285.695

-2.414%
-2.563%
16.778%
-8.299%
-1.253%
2.179%
-4.113%
-7.042%
-6.592%
-16.278%

-0.361
-1.467
1.931*
-1.151
-0.247
0.486
-1.632
-1.564
-3.500**
-1.473

PANEL D

PANEL E
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Table 8: Regression Analysis of Transaction Value

Variables

Coefficient

Transaction Value

-0.0013*
(0.001)

Constant

0.0011
(0.016)

Observations
R-squared
Robust standard errors in parentheses

50
0.043

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 9: Differences in CAR by Industry
Company
Industry
CVS Health Corp
Consumer Retail
The JM Smucker Group
Consumer Retail
Rite Aid Corp
Consumer Retail
Home Depot Inc
Consumer Retail
Coca-Cola Inc
Consumer Retail
International Paper Co
Consumer Retail
Federated Dept. Stores
Consumer Retail
CVS Corp
Consumer Retail
Proctor & Gamble Co
Consumer Retail
National Oilwell Varco Inc
Energy Service
Duke Energy Corp
Energy Service
Transocean Inc
Energy Service
Chevron Texaco Corp
Energy Service
Exxon Mobil Corp
Energy Service
UnitedHealth Group Inc
Health Care/Life Sciences
Express Scripts Inc
Health Care/Life Sciences
Thermo Electron Corp
Health Care/Life Sciences
Johnson & Johnson
Health Care/Life Sciences
Boston Scientific Corp
Health Care/Life Sciences
Pfizer Inc
Health Care/Life Sciences
Boeing Co
Industrial Goods
The Dow Chemical Co
Industrial Goods
IHOP Corp
Real Estate/Gaming/Lesiure
Simon Property Group Inc Real Estate/Gaming/Lesiure
Boston Properties Inc
Real Estate/Gaming/Lesiure
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CAR
0.011%
-0.264%
-4.168%
4.842%
2.549%
-14.759%
5.394%
-8.299%
-6.592%
-5.795%
-5.694%
8.599%
-2.414%
-7.042%
-0.638%
18.211%
-2.036%
-4.059%
-1.253%
-16.278%
0.345%
-6.895%
12.853%
0.972%
-0.470%

T-Statistic
0.005
-0.085
-0.321
1.61
2.183**
-1.455
0.694
-1.151
-3.5**
-0.699
-1.994**
1.802*
-0.361
-1.564
-0.229
1.044
-0.665
-2.326**
-0.247
-1.473
0.135
-1.436
1.512
0.216
-0.199

Table 10: Differences in CAR by Industry (contd.)
Company
Bank of America Corp
Berkshire Hathaway Inc
CME Group Inc
MetLife Inc
Wells Fargo & Co
Capital One Financial Corp
MetLife Inc
Bank of America Corp
Bank of America Corp
Brocade Commun Sys Inc
Cisco Systems Inc
Motorola Inc
Walt Disney Co
Microsoft Corp
Cisco Systems Inc
Oracle Corp
Walt Disney Co
Oracle Corp
Xerox Corp
Verizon Communications
Hewlett Packard Co
SBC Communications Inc
DirecTV Group Inc
Comcast Corp
Verizon Wireless Inc

Industry
Financial Services
Financial Services
Financial Services
Financial Services
Financial Services
Financial Services
Financial Services
Financial Services
Financial Services
Technology/Media/Telecom
Technology/Media/Telecom
Technology/Media/Telecom
Technology/Media/Telecom
Technology/Media/Telecom
Technology/Media/Telecom
Technology/Media/Telecom
Technology/Media/Telecom
Technology/Media/Telecom
Technology/Media/Telecom
Technology/Media/Telecom
Technology/Media/Telecom
Technology/Media/Telecom
Technology/Media/Telecom
Technology/Media/Telecom
Technology/Media/Telecom
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CAR
-0.858%
3.535%
-5.052%
-3.469%
20.842%
-5.356%
-11.400%
-2.563%
-4.113%
-25.954%
0.643%
3.984%
-2.704%
-1.970%
-2.393%
3.971%
-3.932%
-2.657%
-17.273%
-0.546%
-6.559%
-1.430%
0.581%
16.778%
2.179%

T-Statistic
-0.908
1.078
-0.923
-1.598
2.361**
-0.551
-8.58**
-1.467
-1.632
-1.116
0.365
2.191**
-0.976
-1.212
-0.908
1.113
-1.184
-0.987
-0.995
-0.895
-0.731
-0.318
0.377
1.931*
0.486

Table 11: Regression Analysis of Company Industry
Coefficient

Robust Std.
Error

Energy Service

-0.001

0.0358

Financial Services

0.0143

0.0382

Health Care/Life Sciences

0.0136

0.4992

Industrial Goods

-0.0091

0.0357

Real Estate/Gaming/Leisure

0.0682

0.0435

Technology/Media/Telecommunications

0.0004

0.0331

Constant

-0.0237

0.0226

INDUSTRY

Observations
R-squared
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Consumer Retail Industry omitted

50
0.041

Figure 1: Formal Definition of Event Study Windows
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Figure 2: Transaction Value vs. Cumulative Abnormal Returns
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